PAY FIRST, PROTEST LATER:
WHEN OJK REGULATIONS LOCK THE GATES OF JUSTICE
Authored by:
Juventhy M. Siahaan, S.H., M.H.
Managing Partner, JBD Law Firm
I. Introduction
Imagine being fined billions of rupiah by a state institution based on accusations you believe to be erroneous. You wish to file an objection, a right explicitly guaranteed by law. However, before that objection is even read, you are required to settle the entire fine first. It is there that justice begins to have a price—a price that not everyone can afford to pay. This is what is mandated by Article 6 paragraph (1) of OJK Regulation Number 39 of 2025 (POJK 39/2025), a regulation that has newly entered into force since December 22, 2025: locking the gates of justice behind a bill that is not necessarily valid, and whose amount can reach billions of rupiah. This provision is not merely an onerous procedure; it is a norm born in excess of OJK’s authority, contradicting the constitution, and systematically destroying the meaning of the right to object guaranteed by law.
II. Pay First, Protest Later: An Obsolete Principle That Should Have Been Buried
In the world of administrative law, the principle practiced by POJK 39/2025 is known as solve et repete, namely pay first, then you may protest. This principle was born from 19th-century legal traditions where the interest of state revenue was placed far above the right of citizens to question the validity of charges imposed upon them. In its development, this principle has been consistently abandoned by modern administrative law systems. The reason is simple: this principle neuters the rights of citizens and closes access to justice. Sanctions imposed by an authority like OJK are not necessarily precise and correct; they may be based on weak evidence, flawed procedures, or erroneous application of norms. However, by mandating full settlement before an objection can be examined, the state effectively forces citizens to accept that sanction as an absolute and indisputable truth, even though the process of testing its validity has never been conducted. This is not a neutral administrative procedure. This is a presumption of guilt packaged in the language of technical regulation.
What makes this issue serious is not merely because the principle is wrong, but because the consequences are real and directly felt. When OJK imposes a fine of billions of rupiah upon an individual—not a large corporation with a legal team and abundant cash—then the requirement of early settlement is no longer about procedure. It becomes a wall that is practically impenetrable. The right to object, which is formally available, transforms into a right that can only be enjoyed by those with extraordinary financial capacity. At that point, the law ceases to be a protector for everyone and begins to be a privilege for the wealthy only.
III. Three Reasons Why This Rule Cannot Be Maintained
There are three legal reasons, each of which is already sufficient to invalidate Article 6 paragraph (1) of POJK 39/2025, and all three do not require factual debate; they can be read directly from the texts of prevailing laws and regulations.
First, a delegation flaw. Based on Article 7 in conjunction with Article 8 of Law Number 12 of 2011, a POJK is only recognized as a law or regulation as long as it is mandated by a higher-ranking regulation. The question is simple: where is the law that delegates to OJK the authority to make the settlement of a fine a requirement for an objection to be examined? The answer is: there is none. Law Number 21 of 2011 concerning OJK contains no such clause. On the contrary, Law Number 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration guarantees the right to pursue administrative remedies in Article 75 without any financial conditions, and Article 77 paragraph (4) obligates government officials to resolve objections within 10 business days of receipt. OJK created a rule that was never mandated by any law, and that is what in law is termed as exceeding authority (ultra vires).
Second, constitutional prohibition. Article 28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution affirms that restrictions on the rights of citizens can only be established by law (undang-undang), not by institutional regulations. The Constitutional Court has consistently upheld this principle through Decision Number 006/PUU-III/2005, Decision Number 27/PUU-VII/2009, through to Decision Number 48/PUU-XVI/2018: the restriction of constitutional rights cannot arise from administrative policy without legislative legitimacy. A comparison with the taxation system reinforces the standard that should apply: the pay-first principle in tax disputes is regulated in the Law on General Provisions and Tax Procedures, which is a product of the DPR (Parliament) elected by the people, not a regulation OJK made for itself. This difference is not a technical matter of hierarchy; it is a matter of who has the right to restrict the rights of citizens. The answer is the people through their representatives in the DPR, not an administrative body through its own regulation. If the taxation system, which is far more stringent, must pass through the DPR to apply such a principle, then a POJK whose object of obligation is a fine—the validity of which is precisely being questioned—clearly fails to meet the same standard of legitimacy.
Third, violation of the General Principles of Good Administration (AAUPB). The obligation of settlement before an objection is examined violates three principles simultaneously. The principle of proportionality is violated because the objective of collection certainty has been fully accommodated by the mechanism of 2% monthly late interest regulated by Article 3 paragraph (3) of POJK 39/2025 itself, so the early settlement requirement lacks an independent regulatory function. The principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) is violated because making financial capacity a prerequisite for being heard transforms the right to object from a substantive right into an exclusive privilege, contradicting Supreme Court Decision No. 62 K/TUN/2007. And most fundamentally: this objection mechanism has turned into a sham legal remedy—formally available on paper but practically inaccessible to anyone unable to pay billions of rupiah upfront. A condition that was explicitly declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in Decision Number 22/PUU-XVI/2018.
IV. It is Time for OJK to Reform
The three flaws above are not merely technical gaps that can be patched with minor revisions. All three touch upon the most basic foundations of legitimacy, and all three are cumulative: the invalidation of one is sufficient; the invalidation of all three simultaneously makes this provision untenable under any circumstances.
The advice to OJK is only one: separate the obligation to pay the fine from the right to file an objection. Both can run in parallel; the fine remains collectible with interest sanctions, while the objection is examined substantively without financial prerequisites. If OJK feels the pay-first principle is a policy that needs to be maintained, take the correct path: bring it to the DPR, include it in a law, and obtain the democratic legitimacy that has been lacking thus far. Until that occurs, Article 6 paragraph (1) of POJK 39/2025 lacks sufficient legal basis to stand.
A state based on the rule of law is not a slogan. It is a commitment that the authority of the state, no matter how great, is subject to the limits established by law. When a state institution creates rules that lock a citizen's access to justice without a statutory basis, it is not enforcing the law. It is violating it.
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JBD Law Firm This article is prepared for legal education purposes and does not constitute legal advice. For further consultation, contact the JBD Law Firm team.